Сводки с фронта с Русланом Левиевым

Saturday, August 22, and the final week of summer lies ahead. I have a feeling that a week from now, many people will start taking stock of “Russia’s summer campaign,” although there is no summer campaign—especially not this year. Why “especially this year”? Because last year, Russian troops spent the entire summer trying to build on the Vozdvyzhenka breakthrough. This year, the first half of summer was more or less quiet, and noticeable developments along the front line—including dangerous breakthroughs that are now being exploited—only began in the second half. They are now in full swing. Last week, we discussed Ukraine’s gains over the first half of the year in the Oleksandrivka sector, located at the junction of the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Regions. There have been no noticeable developments in this sector over the past week, although “noticeable” is the key word here. Two days ago, Ukrainska Pravda published an extensive article about how the Ukrainian offensive in the Oleksandrivka sector unfolded. Its reporters spoke to Ukrainian servicemen who took part in the operation. They said they had actively used infiltration tactics—the exact same approach employed by the Russian side: sending teams of two or three soldiers deep into the enemy rear, allowing them to build up there, and then launching a surprise attack. They said the tactic was largely successful because Russian troops in that sector were unaware of these infiltrations, so the subsequent attacks in their rear came as a complete surprise. One thing that hampered the Ukrainian troops was inaccurate front-line maps. It turned out that Russian troops had penetrated as far as 10 km deeper than the maps showed. Ukrainian forces therefore had to begin by clearing their own rear. Sometimes they only discovered Russian positions behind them after their offensive had already begun. So the Russian infiltration tactics were successful as well. Therefore, when I say that there have been no noticeable developments in the Oleksandrivka sector this week, I fully acknowledge that one side may currently be infiltrating the other’s rear and preparing to attack soon. As I see it, one particular problem on the Russian side is that they rush to turn every infiltration into a public flag-sticking stunt. Instead of allowing troops to build up and attacking later, but more successfully, they prefer to film a flag as quickly as possible and declare a settlement captured. Naturally, the infiltration is then quickly cleared, and the troops who carried it out are lost. The Ukrainian servicemen interviewed by Ukrainska Pravda said that one objective of the Ukrainian offensive was to halt the Russian army’s advance through the Hulyaipole sector towards Orikhiv. They did achieve that: the Russian army has not advanced farther west beyond Hulyaipole and Zaliznychne for quite some time. On the other hand, the Orikhiv sector was never a major priority for the Russian army. This week, Russian assault troops also infiltrated Novosoloshyne, northwest of Hulyaipole, and staged another flag sticking there. This process—where the Russian military turns quiet troop buildups in the enemy rear into public flag stickings— is further fueled by an urgent need for “damage control.” After last week’s triumphant Ukrainian headlines, Russian commanders badly need public victories. Since last weekend, there has been a wave of posts about Russian assault troops infiltrating the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Regions. But researchers found that the overwhelming majority of these videos were either geolocated incorrectly, recorded some time ago, or generated by AI. So while Russian positions did not collapse on the ground—the Ukrainian forces were gradually retaking their territory— the public narrative made it look like a major AFU victory. Last week, I summarized a more pessimistic assessment of the Dobropillya sector from U.S. analyst Rob Lee. Today, I’ll turn to a researcher known online as Playfra, whose assessment of the same sector is more optimistic for the AFU. According to him, the Russian infiltrations at the junction of the Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka sectors—in the villages of Novomykolaivka, Krasnyi Kut, and Torske—have already been cleared, and the situation there is under Ukrainian control. I would add that I still consider Novomykolaivka a gray zone. How do I distinguish an initial infiltration from a proper gray zone where neither side has firm control? Naturally, I consider the analysts’ opinions and both sides’ assessments, but I also look at how events develop and what the footage shows. If all we see is an isolated flag sticking, as in Novosoloshyne in the Zaporizhzhia Region, I consider it an infiltration into territory controlled by the other side. If the footage shows a large troop presence, confident movement and activity, and if the fighting begins to spread beyond the area shown on camera, then I am more likely to consider it a gray zone. That is why I treat Novosoloshyne in the Zaporizhzhia Region as a flag sticking but Novomykolaivka in the Donetsk Region as a gray zone. The footage clearly shows Russian soldiers roaming around in fairly large groups and moving with confidence. They may eventually be cleared as well, but at this stage, it is still a gray zone. According to Playfra, the AFU does face genuine problems around Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodiaz in the Dobropillya sector. The 1st Azov Corps of Ukraine’s National Guard ran into difficulties there and had to withdraw from several positions. The situation in the Sloviansk– Kramatorsk sector is getting worse. In the middle of the week, the Russian MoD claimed to have captured the village of Orikhuvatka, although I would still consider it a gray zone for now. I have yet to see any signs of firm Russian control over the village. The Ukrainian Telegram channel Mykolaivka–Sloviansk Online also reports new Russian infiltrations into Mykolaivka, a city neighboring Sloviansk just 5 km away. According to the channel, Russian assault groups have even occupied a couple of apartment buildings on the city’s outskirts. Given these developments, by election day we can expect Russian propaganda to start reporting that an operation to storm Sloviansk has begun. Even now, the Russian army could send a couple of flag bearers on a one-way mission to make a dash for the outskirts of Sloviansk and wave a flag for a drone camera. It would be a gesture aimed at the pro-war crowd: we are supposedly approaching the final stage and only need to hold out a little longer. In reality, however, dangerous infiltrations into Sloviansk are still a long way off. The Russian army will not attack Sloviansk head-on from a single direction. It needs to advance farther at the junction of the Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka sectors. The situation in the Lyman sector— and Lyman itself remaining outside Russian control—also obstructs an attack on Sloviansk. Ukrainian drone operators based there can strike Russian troops advancing towards the city. For now, I still see no change in the AFU’s front-line priorities. Yes, the AFU offensive in the Oleksandrivka sector produced results and halted the Russian advance towards Orikhiv. But the most critical part of the war remains the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk sector and the related Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka sectors. Attacks in the Oleksandrivka sector have failed to draw Russian forces away from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. We have already seen something similar with the Kursk operation: the AFU hoped it would draw Russian forces away from the Pokrovsk sector. Oleksandr Syrskyi later admitted that it had failed to do so. I am not saying that Ukraine needs to launch a counteroffensive in the Donetsk Region right now, but it certainly needs to reinforce its defenses. The way Russian forces have advanced in the Dobropillya and Sloviansk–Kramatorsk sectors over the past month clearly indicates a breach in the Ukrainian defenses. The AFU units responsible for these sectors are plainly exhausted and need additional reserves. Before we discuss the reshuffle in the Ukrainian command, let’s pause for a short ad. !AFU LEADERSHIP! At the beginning of the week, Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked the Verkhovna Rada to confirm Yevhenii Khmara, the former head of Ukraine’s Security Service, as Ukraine’s defense minister. That settled the question of whether Mykhailo Fedorov would return to the post. Fedorov responded by releasing a video address to the nation, calling for ideas on how to hold elections even during wartime. Whether or not to hold elections during the war is a choice for Ukrainian society. It is domestic politics, and I will not interfere. I will only say that Fedorov’s statement, in which he also criticized Ukraine’s system of government, was clearly a stab in Zelenskyy’s back. Any other senior government positions are now clearly out of reach for him as well. I don’t know about you, but I get the impression that Fedorov will now try to become an informal power broker in Ukraine’s defense policy. Just a week or a week and a half ago, he released footage from a Ukrainian production line for jet-powered interceptor drones, announcing that the first Ukrainian models had arrived. In general, he carried himself the way senior military commanders normally do. Reuters now reports that he is planning a trip to the U.S. to seek funding for new Ukrainian defense projects. As far as I know, Mykhailo Fedorov is on good terms with the new AFU commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi. Drapatyi publicly supported Fedorov following his dismissal. So Fedorov will probably retain at least some influence over defense policy. In addition to Yevhenii Khmara—who has now been discharged from military service, as required by law, and formally confirmed as defense minister—I would highlight two AFU appointments. Gen. Serhii Sobko has been appointed as one of Mykhailo Drapatyi’s deputies. I first read about him in the spring, before Mykhailo Fedorov’s dismissal, when I received a newsletter from Kovyla Publishing about the forthcoming book Scars and Seeds by Ukrainian general Serhii Sobko. He is a career officer who has spent his entire life in the military and studied extensively at foreign military academies, including in the U.S. He has known Mykhailo Drapatyi since 2006. In 2014, Sobko led a battalion tactical group that deployed to the Luhansk Region and conducted raids. On July 27, his group, together with paratroopers from the 95th Brigade, captured Savur-Mohyla, a key elevation at the junction of the Luhansk and Donetsk Regions and Ukraine’s state border. When Russian forces began shelling Ukrainian troops defending the border in the Luhansk Region from their side, leaving them surrounded, Sobko’s battalion secured the withdrawal of AFU and State Border Guard Service units along the sector from Petrovske to Miusynsk. For precisely these actions, Sobko received the Gold Star and became a Hero of Ukraine in March 2015. In short, judging at least by his biography, he is the real deal: a combat general and a member of Drapatyi’s team. Col. Emil Ishkulov, the former commander of the 80th Air Assault Brigade, has also been appointed to command the 11th Army Corps of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. The 11th Corps is responsible for that same critical front-line sector: the defense of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. I have already mentioned today that the AFU’s Kursk operation failed to draw Russian forces away from the most critical sector at the time, Pokrovsk. I compared it with the Ukrainian offensive in the Oleksandrivka sector and its connection to the situation around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Back in 2024, Emil Ishkulov and the then-AFU commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, opposed the Kursk operation. The problem was that no one understood what the second step would be after territory in the Kursk Region had been occupied. You move in, take control—and then what? What do you do with it, and what results can you expect? Ishkulov will now be responsible for the defense of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has released new data on Russia’s missile stockpiles and production volumes. Russia now manufactures more than 100 ballistic missiles a month. These include Iskander missiles and RM-48U missiles for the S-400 system, which are used to strike ground targets in Ukraine. Ballistic missiles are currently the AFU’s main problem: they are highly destructive and extremely difficult to intercept because of their speed. Doing so requires PAC-3 interceptor missiles for the Patriot system. There is also an unknown number of North Korean KN-23, KN-24, and KN-30 ballistic missiles. We have heard about the KN-23 and KN-24 before and seen them used repeatedly. The KN-30, however, is something new. Its warhead weighs up to 2.5 metric tons, while its range reaches 900 km. What targets would justify using such enormous missiles is not entirely clear—perhaps bridges or major Ukrainian power substations in winter. Even if Russia fired only ballistic missiles that Ukraine cannot intercept, its output would be sufficient to conduct mass ballistic-missile attacks once or twice a week. On top of that, there are Zircon and Onyx missiles, which are also extremely difficult to intercept because of their speed. Then there are cruise missiles, drones, and glide bombs. Ferocious mass attacks on Ukraine have continued throughout this week using every type of weapon. The ballistic missiles are getting through. A certain emotionally charged segment of the audience took issue with my words about Russia’s response. I never expected that I would have to explain what the word “response” means or why it is naive to think that one side’s actions have no effect on the actions of the other. In that much-discussed comment, I said that Russia had begun indiscriminately striking warehouse after warehouse in response to the attacks on Wildberries. This week, we have seen particularly many attacks on stores, including in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Although, yes, many of you will rightly point out that Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are already under massive attacks involving glide bombs, missiles, and drones. There were also strikes on food warehouses in Kyiv and the Kyiv Region, as well as on a shopping mall in Kryvyi Rih, where 15 people were killed and 130 injured. Incidentally, Kryvyi Rih is Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown. We are clearly seeing a further escalation of these massive attacks. What I was getting at is that when planning operations and combat actions, you have to consider the enemy’s potential response and whether you are prepared for it and its consequences. For example, I hope that when Ukrainian forces were planning their campaign against Russian vessels in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, they accounted for the fact that Russia would respond by intensifying its attacks on the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Izmail. That, in turn, would hurt the Ukrainian economy and its exports of grain and various metal products. Apparently, they concluded that the potential benefits of the campaign outweighed the potential consequences of Russia’s response. Russia, too, is plainly preparing for a Ukrainian response. The closer winter gets, the more Russia will use missiles specifically against Ukraine’s energy facilities. It is already attacking them, but the scale will be different in winter. The Russian leadership understands that Ukraine will respond, that drones and Flamingo missiles will strike Russian energy facilities, and that blackouts are possible. That is why it is adopting the necessary regulations for emergency response task forces capable of assessing the impact of attacks on the energy sector. It is relaxing energy-sector regulations by scrapping mandatory deadlines for repairs and recovery work. And Rostec is showcasing mobile power substations capable of restoring electricity to consumers across entire regions during blackouts. So we are approaching the fall and winter period, when we will be discussing the battles for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, as well as the problems facing the energy sector. That’s it for this week. See you next Saturday. Goodbye.